When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed? by Banholzer, Lilli
8/2014Discussion Paper
WhenDoDisarmament,Demobilisation
andReintegrationProgrammesSucceed?
LilliBanholzer
  
When do disarmament, demobilisation and  
reintegration programmes succeed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lilli Banholzer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn 2014 
  
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ISSN 1860-0441 
 
 
 
 
Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; 
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed  
bibliographic data is available at http://dnb.d-nb.de.  
 
ISBN 978-3-88985-597-8 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Lilli Banholzer, Researcher at the department “Governance, Statehood and Security”, German 
Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
E-Mail: lilli.banholzer@die-gdi.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn 
 +49 (0)228 94927-0 
 +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de 
www.die-gdi.de
  
Contents 
Abbreviations 
Executive summary 1 
1 Introduction 3 
2 Why combatants struggle to reintegrate into civilian life 4 
3 The rise of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
programmes 6 
4 Three letters, one goal: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
in practice 9 
4.1 Disarmament 10 
4.2 Demobilisation 13 
4.3 Reintegration 13 
5 Successes and failures: a mixed track record 15 
6 When does DDR work? 17 
6.1 The macro level: the broader context 17 
6.1.1 Economic factors 17 
6.1.2 Political context: regime type and state capacity 18 
6.1.3 A wider recovery strategy 20 
6.1.4 Third-party actors 20 
6.1.5 State of the conflict 22 
6.2 The meso level: the actual programme 23 
6.2.1 Timing 23 
6.2.2 Sequencing and incomplete programmes 23 
6.2.3 Child soldiers 24 
6.2.4 Eligible groups 24 
6.2.5 Tailored assistance 24 
6.3 The micro level: individuals 25 
6.3.1 Participants vs. non-participants 25 
6.3.2 Sociometric characteristics 26 
6.3.3 Traumatisation and other psychological problems 28 
6.3.4 Personal wartime experiences 30 
7 Conclusion and practical implications 30 
Bibliography 33 
  
Tables 
Table 1: The context of DDR programmes in 1989-2010: conflict status, the  
way in which the conflict ended, the presence of an international  
peace mission, and whether DDR was followed by lasting peace 11 
Table 2: The three components of DDR 15 
Table 3: DDR and lasting peace 16 
 
 
 
  
Abbreviations 
CDF Civil Defence Force 
CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple 
CONADER National Commission on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration 
DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente 
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army 
MDRP Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder 
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance) 
RUF Revolutionary United Front 
SIDDR Stockholm Initiative on DDR 
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 
UN United Nations 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (‘National Union for the 
Complete Independence of Angola’) 
UNPK United Nations Peacekeeping mission 
 

When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 1 
Executive summary 
One of the problems in post-war societies is finding ways of convincing former combatants 
to hand in their weapons and reintegrate into civil society. In an attempt to facilitate the 
transition from war to peace, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) 
programmes have become key components of national and international efforts to pacify 
post-conflict societies. Assisting fighters to gain a foothold in civil society is thought to 
prevent them from returning to combat and hence to avoid a resumption of hostilities in the 
long run. In line with sustained investments in DDR programmes, as well as with a 
noteworthy increase in the number and scope of such programmes, a growing – albeit 
relatively small – body of literature is attempting to catch up with these developments. In an 
effort to gather what we know about the factors that contribute to the success of DDR 
programmes, this discussion paper provides a synthesis of the current literature. While 
emphasising the emerging body of quantitative research, it also draws on reports by 
practitioners and in-depth case studies in response to two critical questions:  
1. How effective are DDR programmes?  
2. What factors and circumstances contribute to or impede their success? 
Analytically, this paper locates findings in the literature at three levels:  
• the macro level, i.e. context-specific factors;  
• the meso level, i.e. programme factors;  
• the micro level, i.e. individual factors.  
The following conclusions may be drawn from the literature. Firstly, DDR cannot be taken 
out of context. The success of a DDR programme depends not only on the programme 
itself, but also on a number of context-specific factors that can either facilitate or hamper 
the implementation of the programme.  
• A certain economic threshold raises the chances of DDR being successful as it 
becomes easier to find alternative employment for former combatants. 
• Functioning government institutions help to ensure that states can fulfil their 
commitments and provide the level of security needed for combatants to disarm. 
• The presence of institutionalised, peaceful conflict-solving mechanisms helps prevent 
the rapid escalation of minor conflicts. 
• DDR can help to improve the situation for individuals, but it is not meant to – and 
therefore cannot – improve overall economic or political contexts. A wider recovery 
strategy that embeds DDR in a multi-dimensional peace-building framework is 
therefore essential for success – also to avoid jealousy amongst the rest of the 
population. 
• Of equal help is the presence of a third party on the ground. Even though an external 
force cannot force hostile parties to commit to DDR, it can help to create a framework 
to solve the security dilemma. National ownership is desirable but should be promoted 
only if national capacity and know-how are strong enough, otherwise delays and ill-
functioning programmes may lead to severe frustration and endanger the parties’ 
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overall commitment to DDR.  
In terms of programme design, timing is of the essence and programmes need to match the 
target groups and their needs.  
• DDR works best in stabilising peace – it is not a good tool for peace enforcement and 
as such should be launched after the end of hostilities and/or the signing of a peace 
agreement. DDR is less likely to work if implemented when fighting is still going on.  
• While there is no need to rush into DDR right after signing a peace agreement, do not 
wait too long either, as combatants’ commitment to peace could decline with time and 
frustrations may arise.  
• The eligibility criteria should not be overly restrictive. In many cases, members of 
armed groups fall though the raster of eligibility criteria for DDR programmes and are 
left without assistance. Fighters who used to share arms, for example, are often 
overlooked by “one weapon, one combatant” types of programme.  
• Similarly, female former members of armed groups are often overlooked and need to 
be given more attention.  
• There must also be a focus on ensuring that training and economic reintegration 
programmes match the needs of people on the ground, and that skills training is 
relevant to local markets. Thus, programme design should always include a thorough 
labour market assessment. 
Look out for “high-risk” groups: combatants are not a homogenous group and come with 
different characteristics and experiences which will lead them to struggle more or less 
with the DDR process.  
• Most notably, the age of recruitment matters greatly. The younger the combatants are 
when they join or when they are forced to join the fighting and the longer they remain 
combatants, the less likely they will be able to reintegrate. It is therefore important to 
prevent the recruitment of young fighters at all costs. Their demobilisation can often 
start before the rest of the combatants are tackled.  
• Combatants who have been members of an armed group for many years are less likely 
to participate in the DDR process.  
DDR candidates should always be screened for psychological problems. Not every fighter 
suffers from severe post-traumatic stress, but those who do are much less likely to resume 
a normal life and – if untreated – will be prone to drug abuse, illicit activities and violence. 
As such, they pose a considerable threat to post-conflict stability. 
 
 
When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 3
1 Introduction 
Combatants and former combatants can become a major source of destabilisation in post-
war countries and increase the risk of hostilities being resumed if they decide not to go 
along with the peace process. Dashed expectations, dissatisfaction with their situation at 
the end of the war and difficulties in resettling into civilian life can be powerful triggers 
for combatants to take up their weapons again and resort to war. Schauer / Elbert (2010, 
312) point out that “the risk of re-recruitment is high when ex-combatants fail to 
reintegrate economically and socially into their civil host communities, which may cause 
substantial economic development issues, and a new turn in the cycle of violence becomes 
inevitable”. The devastating war in Angola in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda just one 
year later were both the sad results of soldiers refusing to go along with the peace process. 
The two conflicts cost the lives of more than a million people (Stedman / Rothchild / 
Cousens 2002). 
The particular threat arising from former combatants comes from their high levels of 
organisation, their familiarity with fighting techniques and weaponry, and their 
willingness to use violence, and habit of using violence, as a mean of getting their way 
(Humphreys / Weinstein 2004, 39). The latter point in particular, i.e. their habituation to 
problem-solving by violent means, turns them into a primary peril to the peace process. 
Dzinesa (2008, 6) stresses that “combatants subscribe to a mode of masculinity that is 
imbued with a sense of manly physical strength, personal invulnerability, and high levels 
of conquest desensitised to violence.” The prevalence of such hyper-masculine behaviour 
can lead to different forms of violent and aggressive behaviour, raising the level of 
violence and insecurity in post-war settings and jeopardising peace efforts. Child soldiers 
in particular, who, unlike their adult colleagues, have never experienced anything other 
than a culture of violence and aggression, do not have a chance of internalising the non-
violent conflict-solving mechanisms and behaviours that are required for life in peaceful 
settings (Maedl et al. 2010). When paired with dissatisfaction, the willingness and ability 
to use violence as a means of getting one’s way can be an explosive mixture. The United 
Nations’ Post-Conflict Stabilisation, Peace-Building and Recovery Frameworks (2006, 3) 
summarises why returning soldiers are a problem that needs to be addressed: 
“Ex-combatants, especially when they are young, may have become a ‘lost 
generation’, having been deprived of education, employment and training during the 
conflict period, suffering war trauma, becoming addicted to alcohol and drugs, and 
dependent on weapons and violence as the only means to make their way in the 
world. When they lose their military livelihood, they are likely to experience 
difficulties in adapting to civilian life. Male ex-combatants may engage in anti-social 
behaviour within their families and communities, contributing to an increase in 
economic and social – especially sexual – violence.” 
In response to the imminent threat that returning combatants pose to the peace process, the 
international community is turning increasingly to what are known as disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. These are designed to facilitate 
combatants’ transition from professional fighters to civilians and to reduce their incentives 
to take up arms again. 
Even though these programmes have flourished since the late 1980s, their track record is 
mixed and little is known about the factors that contribute to their success. Research has 
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only recently started to look at DDR programmes. In an effort to review what we do and 
do not know about the success and failure of DDR programmes, this discussion paper 
provides a synthesis of the literature produced to date in response to two critical questions:  
1. How effective are DDR programmes?  
2. What factors and circumstances contribute to or impede their success? 
This paper unfolds in a series of steps. To pave the way for a synthesis of the literature, we 
start by discussing why and how combatants may jeopardise the peace process. We also 
paint a picture of the emergence of DDR programmes. The focus then shifts to a review of 
the literature on DDR, drawing on reports by practitioners, case studies, as well as studies 
on peace-building. The emphasis is on quantitative research. As will be demonstrated, the 
factors identified in the literature as contributing to the successful implementation of DDR 
are located at three different levels: 
1. macro level, i.e. contextual, country-specific features such as economic stability or the 
existence of democratic institutions that not only impinge on the overall risk of a 
return to hostilities, but also affect the likelihood of a DDR programme being 
implemented in the first place;  
2. meso level, i.e. features of specific DDR programmes, including but not limited to the 
types of aid offered or the actors involved;  
3. micro level, i.e. individual characteristics and experiences that affect combatants’ 
willingness and ability to surrender their weapons and reintegrate into civil society.  
This paper offers a multi-dimensional perspective on DDR and the factors contributing to 
its success, adding a new holistic framework to the existing body of literature. 
2 Why combatants struggle to reintegrate into civilian life 
As outlined by the United Nations (UN), there are many potential sources of discontent 
and frustration for ex-combatants. Economically, returning soldiers may struggle with a 
loss of income-generating activity following the dissolution of militant groups. The end of 
war implies the end of their careers and a decline in their income. Lacking education, 
experience and credentials for civilian jobs, former soldiers may encounter tremendous 
problems in finding alternative employment. Even in a stable and large economy like the 
US, large-scale studies of Vietnam veterans show that the absorption of former soldiers 
into the civilian labour market was initially slow and that many veterans had trouble 
finding new jobs. While some analyses claim that the US economy was eventually able to 
absorb the returning soldiers and that post-war salaries became comparable to those of 
non-veterans (Berger / Hirsch 1983), others point to a 15% long-term loss in earnings by 
white Vietnam veterans due to a loss of work experience (Angrist 1990).1  
                                                 
1 Angrist (1990) and Costa and Kahn (2010) all found evidence of a general rise in lifetime earnings for 
black Vietnam veterans. 
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Even industrialised countries like the United States of America (US) struggle with the 
absorption of veterans into the civilian labour market. The situation in developing 
countries, however, with poorly performing and often war-damaged economies and where 
the population is already suffering from unemployment and poverty, is far more 
demanding. Being mostly uneducated, many veterans in developing countries face severe 
challenges in finding a new occupation. Particularly those veterans who joined or were 
forced to join an armed force at a very early age are unlikely to have received any kind of 
education apart from military training (Gear 2002). Specht (2000, 6) summarises the 
problem as follows: “When rebels and soldiers are demobilised, they become job-seekers. 
They join the large group of unemployed youth in countries with a broken economy, due to 
the conflict.” These unemployed ex-combatants are easy targets for existing or new rebel 
groups or criminal gangs. 
In their search for new sources of income, former combatants run a high risk of resorting 
to violent or criminal activities. Many may consider joining rebel groups in other 
countries. Eastern European and South African ex-combatants, for example, are known to 
have become mercenaries in violent conflicts in Angola and the Congo, and to have 
contributed to their destabilisation (Alden 2002). In other cases and in the absence of 
opportunities in the legal job market, some war veterans turn to crime. This affects 
developed and developing nations alike. In Northern Ireland, Smyth (2010) observed a big 
shift from political violence to criminal behaviour. Equally, war veterans in Russia and the 
Balkans are known to have joined and expanded criminal networks (Alden 2002). 
This problem is arguably more pronounced in the poorly performing legal economies of 
developing countries. Deprived of any future prospects, many ex-combatants regard illicit 
activities and criminal banditry as a last resort in their quest to make a living. As a result, 
crime rates in post-war countries often rise when combatants return from war (Knight / 
Özerdem 2004). In East Timor, the dismissal of one third of the defence force into a 
scattered economy, unable to absorb the new job-seekers, led to a series of armed clashes, 
an increase in gang violence and the eventual breakdown of law and order in 2006. This 
period is known as “the crisis” among the inhabitants of the youngest independent Asian 
Pacific country and is a vivid illustration of the dangers that lurk once hostilities have 
formally ceased (Peake 2008). 
However, unrest among ex-fighters may also have other causes, such as the urge for 
justice and compensation. Having served in an army and defended either states or interest 
groups, former combatants may believe that their contribution should be officially 
recognised and financially rewarded (Rolston 2007). A failure to deliver what Schafer 
(1998) termed “compensatory justice” has led to discontent among ex-fighters in many 
countries.  
Empirical evidence for this is found all over the globe. In El Salvador, ex-combatants 
occupied and threatened parliament in a protest against the non-distribution of promised 
payments, credits and land, all of which should have rewarded soldiers for their 
contributions to the country (Berdal 1996). In 1990, Zimbabwe was burdened with 25,000 
unemployed war veterans, who, as members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association, resorted to considerable force to achieve their political and economic 
aims (Dzinesa, 2008). In Bosnia-Hercegovina, former combatants set up roadblocks to force 
the government to hand out pensions and housing support, to which they believed they were 
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entitled (King 2000). In a detailed qualitative analysis of the demobilisation process in 
Namibia, Colletta et al. (1996, 209) described how unsatisfied former fighters threatened 
to “turn Namibia into another Rwanda” during their protests against the government’s 
lack of responsiveness to their demands. 
In their seminal study on combatants in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) 
looked at the relationship between justice and demobilisation and reintegration from 
another angle. After systematically interviewing over 1,000 ex-combatants, the authors 
found a significant negative correlation between soldiers’ belief that their party was worse 
off than the enemy party and their willingness to break ties with their militant faction. In 
other words, those who believed that the peace process was unfair were less willing to 
loosen their bonds with their former armed group, signalling a readiness to return to war if 
necessary. 
The experience of combat and living in extreme deprivation and constant fear and stress 
does not leave former combatants unharmed. Former combatants are frequently known to 
suffer from mental health issues, which may turn out to be a major obstacle to their 
successful reintegration into civilian life. While psychological support and treatment are 
fairly widely available in industrial countries, ex-combatants in poor countries receive 
little help. Also, in comparison with studies of political and economic factors, researchers 
have largely neglected individual mental hazards and their influence on the peace process 
(Maedl et al. 2010, 178). This ignorance of mental health problems seems unjustifiable, 
considering what is known about their severity and impact. In a household survey 
conducted in Somaliland in 2002, seven years after the last civil war, Odenwald et al. 
(2005) found that 16% of former combatants were still incapable of performing an 
income-generating activity due to their severe psychological problems. A clinical 
observation study in Southern Sudan found evidence of increased aggression and a 15% 
higher suicide rate among former combatants as compared with non-combatants. The 
same study found a worrisome level of alcohol abuse, which was correlated to domestic 
violence among former combatants (Winkler 2010, 25). Schauer emphasised the 
consequences of mental health hazards: “Some ex-combatants experience long-lasting 
symptoms that are correlated with unemployment, divorce, spousal and general violence, 
homelessness, criminal behaviour and substance abuse and addiction” (World Bank 
2006, 2). 
3 The rise of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes 
The notion that the “lost generation” of former combatants pose a tremendous risk to 
countries caught in a “conflict trap”, as Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) have termed the 
vicious cycle of renewed war, has aroused a great deal of attention in research and 
practice. Anxious to find peace-stabilising mechanisms, the international community has 
reacted to this apparent danger by implementing and supporting demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Designed and implemented not only 
by the UN, but also by a large number of other international organisations, national 
governments and NGOs, these programmes seek to mitigate the risk posed by ex-
combatants, by assisting their disarmament and helping them reintegrate into civil society. 
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It is not only in modern times that managing returning soldiers has been perceived as a big 
problem. War veterans in the ancient Roman Empire were regarded as a worrisome source 
of unrest, as many of them joined criminal groups after their release from the army. 
Offering their fighting skills to illegal groups was an option that many veterans chose 
because few could live on their savings and therefore saw no other way of making a 
living. Historic accounts suggest that the ancient Romans used crude forms of DDR 
assistance in response to this, such as the distribution of farmland to former soldiers or 
their re-recruitment into the army (Shaw 1984). Lamb (2008, 3) found evidence of DDR 
programmes at the beginning of the 20th century, following the end of the second Boer 
War in South Africa in 1902.  
Large numbers of soldiers were also demobilised after the end of the two World Wars, but 
with quite different results. The hasty and disorganised demobilisation of German soldiers 
at the end of the First World War resulted in a failure to collect all their weapons (Bieber 
2002). Many of these arms were later used in partisan struggles and hampered the 
establishment of a democratic order. Moreover, a failure to set up an organisation to help 
veterans with their transition to civil life caused great problems in their ability to adapt to 
the emerging democratic structures.  
The US saw these failures as an incentive to improve demobilisation practices after the 
Second World War. US soldiers were demobilised in stages rather than all at once, to 
avoid a sudden influx of war veterans into the civilian population and labour market. 
Soldiers were also offered an opportunity to take their school or college exams before they 
were discharged. In contrast to the German experience in the First World War, there were 
fewer setbacks and problems with the demobilisation of US veterans. 
Formal international programmes for the disarmament and reintegration of combatants 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their scope and size grew in line with the 
growing involvement of the international community in peace-building. In 1989, the 
United Nations Observer Group in Central America conducted a voluntary disarmament 
and demobilisation programme in Nicaragua. In the same year, 30,000 combatants from 
the South African forces and 13,000 combatants from the People’s Liberation Army of 
Namibia were demobilised in Namibia (Kingma 1997, 3). Cambodia followed these 
efforts in 1992 with its own demobilisation programme (known as the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia). 
It was soon acknowledged that collecting and destroying arms was not enough to prevent 
former combatants from hampering the peace process. Rather, in order to lessen their 
interest in continuing to fight in the long term, former combatants had to be given new 
prospects for the future and an opportunity to start over again as integrated members of 
civil society. The United Nations was the first to focus not only on disarmament and 
demobilisation, but also on the resettlement and reintegration of former combatants in the 
course of its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Dahl Thruelsen 2006, 8). 
From 2000 onwards, DDR projects started to broaden their scope from single-country to 
multi-country operations, taking account of the regional dimension inherent to many wars. 
Most notably, the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), 
led by the World Bank, embraced seven countries in the Great Lakes region of Central 
Africa (Lamb 2008, 4). 
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This particular type of peace intervention is now broadening its scope at an incredible 
pace. According to the Human Security Report for 2009–10 (Human Security Report 
Project 2010), there has been a nine-fold increase in the number of DDR operations since 
the end of the Cold War, at a time when the number of international missions has “merely” 
tripled. DDR has evolved into an instrument on which the international community now 
relies strongly: not only did all of the past seven peace-keeping operations2 mandated by the 
UN Security Council include a DDR programme, the UN also supported DDR missions in 
countries where there were no official UN peace-keeping operations. This was the case in 
Indonesia (Ache), Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Niger, Somalia and Uganda (United Nations 2010). 
Such efforts do not come without costs and the need to invest large resources. USD 1.599 
billion was spent on DDR programmes in 2007, an average of USD 1,434 per demobilised 
combatant (Caramés / Sanz 2008). In the same year, nine out of the 19 countries undergoing 
DDR were among the lowest-ranking countries in terms of human development. The 
weighted average per capita cost of the 19 programmes effectively exceeded annual per 
capita income in these countries by a factor of three and a half (ibid.). 
The number of actors involved in conceiving and executing such programmes has also risen 
substantially. Even though the UN has clearly assumed a leading role in the implementation 
of DDR programmes, a multitude of other international organisations, as well as 
international and local NGOs, are also closely involved. DDR efforts in Liberia, for 
example, are led by UNICEF but strongly supported by the World Food Program, the 
World Health Organisation, Action Aid and the United Nations Development Programme 
(Handson, 2007). The MDRP programme in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa is 
currently the largest programme in the world, with a budget of over USD 240 million. 
This multi-agency programme was launched in 2002 and aims to support 300,000 ex-
combatants in seven countries, i.e. Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda and Uganda (World 
Bank, 2010). The programme is funded by the World Bank, 12 industrialised countries3 
and the European Commission, and embraces more than 30 partner organisations, 
including the UN. While the “DD” part, i.e. demobilisation and disarmament, generally 
remains the domain of governments or the UN, the reintegration aspect tends to be the 
common denominator for a plethora of NGO-sponsored development projects. 
                                                 
2  United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC, 1999), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), United Nations Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004), United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), United 
Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB, 2004) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, 
2005). 
3  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
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4 Three letters, one goal: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
in practice 
DDR may generally be regarded as a transitory tool, aimed at facilitating the conversion 
from war to peace by helping individuals give up their lives as combatants and revert to a 
civilian life. As Casas-Casas and Guzmán-Gómez (2010, 58) put it, “DDR contributes to 
achieving a lasting peace process where those involved directly in the conflict can break 
with the past”. The Final Report of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR, or SIDDR for short 
(2006, 25), regards DDR as creating a “transitional safety net” to ensure that combatants 
do not need to return to war in order to survive. In this regard, DDR can be located within 
the paradigm of peace-keeping and peace-building and is often actually embedded in 
broader peace operations. DDR also contributes to state-building because it involves a 
shift from the formal and informal rules of militant groups to the laws defined by the state 
(Casas-Casas / Guzmán-Gómez 2010, 58).  
DDR programmes differ in location, duration, size and scope. Most, though not all, 
current DDR programmes are in operation in Africa. Several initiatives are also in 
progress in Asia, Europe and the Americas. The majority of programmes have a lifespan 
of one or two years, but some are of longer duration. Bosnia-Hercegovina’s DDR 
programme, which remained operational for 12 years, is an exceptional example. The 
average budget is roughly USD 102 million per project, ranging from as low as USD 1.7 
million USD in the case of Niger to USD 565 million in the case of Sudan.4 These figures 
should be treated with caution, however. Budgets tend to be adjusted as programmes 
proceed, and pledged resources are sometimes not disbursed in their entirety, in part to 
penalise non-compliance with donor requirements or programme mismanagement. With 
the possible exception of the highly detailed World Bank reports, little information is 
generally provided on the precise value of the resources allocated. The same is true of the 
number of demobilised combatants, as reliable records are often missing. It is clear, 
however, that the range is very wide: whereas around 4,000 combatants were targeted in 
Haiti and 5,000 in Northern Ireland, up to 370,000 soldiers were targeted by DDR 
activities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The settings in which DDR programmes are implemented differ from case to case. As a 
general rule of thumb, three questions are particularly relevant here: 
1. What is the state of the conflict?  
2. If it has ended, how has it ended?  
3. Are international actors involved and, if so, in what way?  
Some DDR programmes are launched while hostilities are still going on – and as such aim 
to have a pacifying effect. However, most programmes are implemented after the end of a 
war and are therefore thought to exert a stabilising effect. Conflicts that end with a peace 
agreement rather than victory by one side are more likely to be followed by a DDR 
programme. But there are also instances in which DDR programmes have been launched 
after the termination of war without a peace agreement, for example in the Central African 
Republic, where the victory of one side brought an end to hostilities.  
                                                 
4  Based on our own estimates. 
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Even in cases where a peace agreement is signed, it does not necessarily contain references 
to DDR, let alone outline specific measures. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Programme (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset v. 1.0, 1989–2005 (Harbom / Högbladh / 
Wallenstee 2006), DDR has been mentioned in only 63 of 148 peace agreements (43%) 
since the end of the Cold War. This of course means in turn that, in 85 cases (or 57%), the 
peace agreement did not contain DDR measures. While international peace missions are 
often on the ground when DDR is implemented, this is not always the case. In 14 out of 40 
cases, DDR programmes were operated without any international peace mission. Table 1 
outlines the contextual settings in which 40 DDR programmes have been implemented since 
1989 and shows whether lasting peace followed the DDR intervention. 
Although DDR programmes usually consist of three components, not all of them are 
implemented in all cases. Some programmes focus exclusively on disarmament and 
demobilisation, while others skip the “DD” part to directly address the issue of reintegration. 
Indonesia and Rwanda, for example, decided that reintegration support only was needed 
(Caramés / Sanz 2009, 10). While each programme is different, some standard procedures 
have emerged. These are outlined in the following sections. 
4.1 Disarmament 
The process of disarmament is usually the initial step. It comprises the assembly of 
combatants, the collection and documentation of weapons, and the verification and 
certification of disarmed soldiers so as to assess their eligibility for further assistance and 
benefits (United Nations 2010). The short-term aim is to enhance security by reducing the 
number of weapons owned by individuals and to restore trust among warring parties. In 
the long term, the process is intended to prevent the circulation of small arms in particular 
and their proliferation to other countries through the black market. In many instances, the 
weapons collected are publicly incinerated as a testament to the end of the war and the 
destruction of its deadly tools. Knight and Özerdem (2004) emphasise the symbolic power 
of this stage of the process. A successful start to disarmament instils trust in the entire 
peace process and paves the way for the next stages. Inversely, delays and 
mismanagement can have destructive consequences. Armed groups may lose confidence 
in the peace process and their commitment to it may fade. 
The disarmament of combatants may take the form of the unilateral disarmament of one 
group, the bilateral disarmament of two opposing groups or – in the most complex case – 
multiple disarmaments of a number of armed groups. Depending on the situation and, in 
the case of UN involvement, on the Chapter under which the UN mission is operating, the 
disarmament process may follow one of three approaches (Tanner 1996):  
1. a consensual approach in which all conflicting parties agree to hand in their weapons; 
2. a coercive approach in which one or more parties are forced to disarm; 
3. a compelling approach based on a “carrots and sticks” philosophy.  
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Table 1: The context of DDR programmes in 1989-2010: conflict status, the way in which the 
conflict ended, the presence of an international peace mission, and whether DDR was 
followed by lasting peace  
 Start 
of 
DDR 
End of 
DDR 
Status of conflict 
when DDR 
started 
Way in 
which 
conflict 
ended 
International 
peace 
mission? 
DDR 
followed 
by lasting 
peace? 
Afghanistan  2003 2005 Ongoing --- Yes No 
Angola  1994 1996 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Angola  2002 2009 Ongoing Low activity Yes No 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
1995 2007 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Burundi 2004 2008 Ongoing Peace 
agreement 
Yes No 
Cambodia 1992 1993 Ongoing Victory Yes Yes 
Central African  
Republic 
2004 2007 Terminated Victory Yes No 
Chad 2005 2010 Ongoing Low activity Yes No 
Colombia 2003 2006 Ongoing --- No No 
Congo-Brazzaville 2008 2009 Terminated Ceasefire No Yes 
Democratic  
Republic of Congo 
2004 2012 Ongoing Peace 
agreement 
Yes No 
El Salvador 1992 1993 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Eritrea-Ethiopia I 1993 1997 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Eritrea-Ethiopia II 2002 2008 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Ethiopia-Eritrea I 1991 1994 Terminated Victory No Yes 
Ethiopia-Eritrea II 2000 2007 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Guatemala 1996 1998 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Guinea Bissau 2001 2005 Terminated Victory No Yes 
Haiti 1994 1996 Terminated Victory Yes No 
Indonesia (East 
Timor) 
1999 2001 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Indonesia (Aceh) 2005 2009 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Ivory Coast 2005 2008 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
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In practice, however, the boundaries between the different approaches are blurred. For 
example, disarmament could start with mutual agreement, but become more coercive as 
the parties’ commitment fades.    
Liberia 2003 2008 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Mali (Azawad) 1996 1997 Terminated Low activity No No 
Mozambique 1992 1994 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Namibia 1989 1989 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Nepal 2007 2012 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Nicaragua 1989 1992 Ongoing Ceasefire Yes Yes 
Niger  
(Air and Azawad) 
2006 2007 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Philippines  
(Mindanao) 
1997 2006 Ongoing --- No No 
Rwanda I 1997 2001 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No No 
Rwanda II 2001 2008 Ongoing Low activity No No 
Serbia 1999 2001 Terminated Peace 
agreement 
No Yes 
Sierra Leone 1998 2004 Ongoing Peace 
agreement 
Yes Yes 
Somalia 2003 2007 Terminated --- No No 
Sudan 2005 2012 Ongoing --- Yes No 
Tajikistan 1999 2003 Terminated Victory Yes Yes 
Uganda I 1992 1995 Ongoing Low activity Yes No 
Uganda II 2000 2008 Ongoing Low activity No No 
UK (Northern  
Ireland) 
1998 2005 Terminated Ceasefire No Yes 
Total   26 (terminated) / 
14 (ongoing) 
 23  
Source:  Information on DDR: own data. Information on the ay in which the conflict ended and data on 
lasting peace were taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Peace 
Agreement Dataset v. 1.0, 1989-2005 (Harbom / Högbladh / Wallenstee 2006) and the UCDP 
Conflict Termination dataset v.2010-1, 1946–2009. 
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Overall, though, few programmes are outright coercive in nature and operate under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Most rely on disarmament by consensus or persuasion. In a 
number of missions, the UN convinced combatants to disarm by trading their weapons for 
goods, most notably in the weapons-for-cash programmes used in El Salvador, Haiti, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia (Tanner 1996; Knight / Özerdem 2004). 
Trading weapons for cash has raised concerns and met with criticism, however, as the cash 
might be used to acquire more modern weaponry. Later programmes have partly addressed 
this concern. In El Salvador, for instance, weapons were exchanged for vouchers (Laurance 
/ Godnick 2001). 
4.2 Demobilisation 
Demobilisation is defined as the “formal and controlled discharge of active combatants 
from armed forces […]” (United Nations 2010). The process usually starts with the 
opening of reception centres, which provide a first home for returning combatants. 
Demobilisation programmes continue by preparing former combatants for, and helping 
them with, their re-entry into civilian life. During the demobilisation stage, soldiers are 
usually cantoned in demobilisation sites or camps. Combatants are separated from their 
commanders and eventually transported back to their home towns or new living quarters 
(Handson 2007). Sometimes, certain fighters are exempted from this practice and 
integrated into the regular armed forces in order to sustain a functioning military body. In 
Ivory Coast, about half of the targeted 10,000 combatants were integrated into the army, 
while the others underwent demobilisation. During the process of demobilisation, former 
fighters may receive immediate support in the form of medical checks, information on 
HIV/AIDS, direct cash payments, tool kits or vocational training sessions. 
4.3 Reintegration 
Arguably the most complicated stage starts when former combatants arrive home and have 
to readjust to civilian life. While some fighters are respectfully welcomed back as heroes, 
others are eyed suspiciously and rejected by their host community. Child soldiers and 
fighters who belonged to very abusive and violent militias often meet with particularly 
hostile reactions from their communities (see Humphreys / Weinstein 2007). In northern 
Uganda and the DRC, some families refused to take back children who had been abducted 
and forced to fight in armed groups. As a former child soldier from the DRC recounted in 
an interview, “some of us – and especially those who lost their feet – were rejected by 
their families. The luckier ones were embraced” (Njata 2012). 
A primary objective in this phase is the absorption of former fighters by the labour market, 
so that they gain access to income-generating activities and join their communities’ social 
networks. These not only replace the jobs and salaries they have lost, but also ensure that 
veterans develop a sense of belonging and well-being in their new civilian environment. In 
this endeavour, reintegration measures include different forms of support, which can 
roughly be divided into three categories: economic assistance, education and psychosocial 
support. 
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• Economic assistance: financial assistance is commonly awarded in the form of single 
payments, monthly rents or a number of instalments. The amount of money an ex-
combatant receives varies from one country and programme to another. One of the 
lowest levels of financial assistance was given to returning soldiers in the DRC. They 
received a single payment of USD 11 when leaving the orientation centre, plus 
monthly payments of USD 25 for a number of months.5 Combatants in Liberia and 
Rwanda received USD 300 and 350 respectively, while soldiers in Indonesia were 
each paid USD 500 in three instalments. In certain cases, the amount of compensation 
depends on the military rank of the individual concerned. Enlisted personnel in 
Burundi received only USD 91, while commanders where paid up to USD 586 
(Caramés / Fisas / Sanz 2007, 32). 
• Education: individuals lacking appropriate skills may receive basic education and 
vocational training and eventually assistance in finding a job or starting a business. 
This type of support is often outsourced to (smaller) NGOs. In northern Uganda, for 
example, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been offering a one-year 
programme for war-affected adolescents since 1997. In addition to basic education (in 
reading, writing and arithmetic), adolescents receive lessons in human rights and 
democracy. They can then choose from training courses in catering, tailoring, 
carpentry and bricklaying. In the DRC, NGOs offer vocational training in car 
mechanics, handicraft, soap production and leatherwear. In Eritrea, the Ministry of 
Education, supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency, ran 23 courses 
in construction, hairdressing, agriculture and plumbing. 1,722 demobilised soldiers 
received a total of USD 1.47 million as part of a microcredit and loan plan (Sanz 
2009a). 
• Psychosocial support: this is another, somewhat less prominent field. The objective 
is to foster the social and psychological well-being of ex-combatants in their daily 
lives, and also to nurture their ability to build social relationships, pursue careers and 
relate to their communities (MDRP 2006). Activities take different forms, ranging 
from psychological counselling in private sessions to collective role-plays and 
traditional ceremonies. 
  
                                                 
5  There is no reliable account of how long these monthly payments were made.  
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5 Successes and failures: a mixed track record  
As attempts to support the transition from war to peace, DDR interventions have recorded 
some impressive achievements in terms of demobilisation and disarmament. Nicaragua, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Sierra Leone are just three examples of countries where armed 
forces have been efficiently reduced in size and weapons collected. In 31 months, the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua was reduced from 90,000 members to 
just 15,520 active soldiers (Rolston 2007, 264). 370,000 combatants were demobilised in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in the five years following the Dayton peace settlement, leading to a 
noteworthy reduction in the number of arms in circulation (Pietz 2004, 24). In Sierra 
Leone, expectations were even exceeded. Although previous estimates suggested that 
45,000 combatants needed to be demobilised from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and other militant groups, in practice no fewer than 
75,490 combatants6 handed in their weapons (United Nations 2011). The efficient 
demobilisation and disarmament operation has undoubtedly helped to prevent a renewed 
outbreak of war in these countries. 
These success stories are complemented by numerous failures and setbacks. The cases of 
Cambodia and Angola demonstrate that, despite immense efforts, DDR programmes 
sometimes fail in their endeavours. During demobilisation and disarmament efforts in 
Cambodia (1992), the warring parties cooperated only hesitantly and frequently blocked 
the UN’s work. In the first attempt at disarmament, only around 13,000 out of the 
projected total of 200,000 soldiers reported to the cantonment sites. Even worse, one of 
the main armies, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (also known as the Khmer Rouge), 
refused all along to disarm and exploited the fading military strength of the compliant 
                                                 
6  ≈10,000 ex-Sierra Leone Army/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ex-SLA/AFRC), plus 55,000 
CDF combatants, 7,000 RUF soldiers and 3,000 child combatants as well as 300 disabled.combatants 
Table 2: The three components of DDR 
Phase Support 
Disarmament  Assembly of soldiers, documentation, and collection and sometimes destruction of 
weapons 
Demobilisation  Cantonment of soldiers  
Supplying basic needs, i.e. food, medication, housing, clothing, basic education and 
counselling 
Census 
Discharge documentation 
Sometimes first part of reinsertion package 
Transport to home town 
Reinsertion/ 
Reintegration 
Job generation and placement 
Education and training 
Provision of tool kits, clothing, food and housing materials 
Distribution of farmland 
Credit schemes 
Psychological counselling 
Direct financial assistance, i.e. cash payments and loans 
Source:  Own data 
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armed groups by taking aggressive action and mounting attacks. The UN Secretary-
General suspended the programme for this reason in November 1992. Seven years later, 
the World Bank made a renewed attempt to demobilise and reintegrate Cambodia’s 
soldiers. The international lender targeted 30,000 soldiers with USD 18.4 million in funds 
and a detailed plan (Center for International Cooperation and Security 2008a). Four years 
later, the World Bank cut spending by USD 6.3 million due to mismanagement and 
corruption. In the end, the final report rated the programme’s performance and outcome as 
‘rather unsatisfactory’ (World Bank 2006).  
A similar failure was experienced in Angola. During an attempt to disarm combatants in 
Angola in 1994, a resistance force called UNITA (the National Union for the Complete 
Independence of Angola) sent mainly disabled and conscripted soldiers to the 
disarmament sites, leaving its key forces intact (Center for International Cooperation and 
Security 2008b). In the end, no full disarmament was achieved, faith in and commitment 
to the peace process evaporated and hostilities resumed.  
Both cases illustrate that DDR programmes do not always work and may fail despite 
immense efforts. However, it is not easy to judge whether DDR is a success or failure. In 
the academic literature, the merits of peace missions in general are determined mainly by 
observing whether such missions have achieved their long-term objective, namely the 
stabilisation of war-torn countries and hence the establishment of stable peace. As the 
Final Report produced by the SIDDR states, “when implemented, the DDR programme 
should ideally influence and contribute to a secure environment that can provide minimum 
basic conditions to enable long-term development without the immediate threat of violent 
conflicts” (SIDDR 2006, iv). 
As Table 3 shows, out of 40 countries undergoing DDR, 24 experienced long-lasting 
peace, while in the remaining 16 cases the warring parties resumed their hostilities. 
However, programme evaluations rarely use peace as an indicator and rely more on 
practical measures – that is, if any evaluation takes place at all. The only detailed 
programme evaluations are conducted by the World Bank, which uses a thorough 
evaluation process, including general conflict indicators, to match achievements against 
previously set goals (World Bank 2010). In many cases, however, there is no systematic 
evaluation and judgements about the effectiveness of individual missions can at best be 
derived from descriptive mission reports. 
Table 3: DDR and lasting peace 
 Without DDR  With DDR Total 
No reversion to conflict   75 (40%) 24 (60%)   99 
Reversion to conflict  117 (61%) 16 (39%) 133 
Total 192 40 232 
Pearson chi square (χ2)= 5.98 (*) 
Cramér's V = - 0.16   
*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1 
Source:  Information on DDR: own data. Information on conflict termination / reversion were taken 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset v. 1.0, 1989-
2005 (Harbom / Högbladh / Wallenstee 2006) and the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset 
v.2010-1, 1946–2009. 
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6 When does DDR work?  
While countries employing DDR generally seem to have a better chance of remaining at 
peace than countries that do not undergo DDR, 40% of the former still experience a 
renewed outbreak of violence. This raises the following question: what are the conditions 
in which DDR programmes are successful? What does the literature tell us about the 
success factors for DDR?  
When discussing the effectiveness and impact of DDR programmes, scholars and 
practitioners look at slightly different sets of variables. Academic studies tend to pay 
somewhat more attention to macro-conditions, i.e. structural factors that affect DDR 
programmes. These comprise notably the social, political and economic conditions that 
need to be met for a programme to be set up and carried out. Academic researchers are 
also interested in the characteristics of the conflict in relation to which a DDR programme 
is launched, and the role of third-party actors. Most practitioners, on the other hand, are 
more concerned with the technical aspects and architectural design of DDR interventions. 
Oddly enough, while both acknowledge, at least conceptually, that the combatants’ 
characteristics and pre-dispositions matter a great deal, few studies have looked directly at 
individuals.  
The following sections review the main findings on DDR and look at the success factors 
in greater detail. This literature review covers all levels of analysis, from macro to meso 
and micro levels. It uses a wide lens, incorporating findings from studies on peace-
building and peace-keeping as well as other research on the structural determinants of 
durable peace. 
6.1 The macro level: the broader context 
6.1.1 Economic factors 
The notion that low-income countries run a higher risk of civil war and struggle harder to 
become peaceful again is widely accepted among political scientists and economists 
(Bazzi / Blattman 2011; Blattman / Miguel 2010). A dependence on primary commodity 
exports is also seen as raising the likelihood of conflict and war (Collier / Hoeffler 2004). 
These economic theories of insurrection, which can be traced back to Tullock (1971), 
Grossman (1991) and Lichbach (1995), are based on an assumption that opportunity cost 
considerations lead to rebellion. The opportunity cost argument is exactly what drives the 
international community to implement DDR: the opportunity cost for fighters to return to 
combat should be raised so high that it is more attractive for them to work as civilians than 
to remain soldiers. 
However, DDR programmes have only limited tools with which to bring this about. They 
can offer vocational training to provide combatants with relevant skills for the civilian 
labour market. They can grant combatants loans with which to start their own businesses, 
and provide other types of initial help. DDR programmes will find it more difficult to get 
off the ground, however, if the civilian economy is shattered. If income-generating 
opportunities even for skilled individuals are simply lacking, the vocational training 
offered by DDR initiatives will not produce the desired effect of giving former combatants 
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an alternative to employment in armed groups. This dilemma is illustrated by anecdotal 
evidence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During interviews in 
Bukavu, a small town in the east of the DRC, young demobilised combatants explained 
that they were thinking of rejoining rebel groups if, having been trained as carpenters with 
the support of certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs), they continued to be short 
of customers. Caught in a trap of poverty and boredom, they began to see returning to the 
bush as a more desirable alternative (Banholzer 2013).  
Practitioners meeting at the International Peace Academy in 2002 likewise observed that 
high unemployment rates and shattered economies hampered DDR (International Peace 
Academy 2002, 3). The problem in such settings, as Knight and Özerdem point out (2004, 
516), is that combatants who are reintegrated into civil society are “reintegrated into 
poverty”, which ultimately lowers the opportunity cost of taking up arms again. In badly 
performing economies that are unable to absorb returning combatants, the latter may 
concentrate in urban areas and in the worst case resort to criminal activities or rejoin 
armed groups, as Kingma (1997) and Kingma and Grebrewold (1998, 12) have noted. 
Empirical evidence from a study of over 7,000 Somali combatants suggests that 
combatants are more willing to disarm if there is a prospect of returning to an 
economically stable region, as compared with combatants who return to an economically 
unstable region (Banholzer / Schneider / Odenwald 2013). 
However, while economic stability might favour the peace process, there is no guarantee 
that combatants will reintegrate easily in well-performing economies. Even in 
economically healthy settings, former fighters may have problems in finding new 
occupations if they are stigmatised or socially excluded, for example. In Northern Ireland, 
members of armed groups who were released from prison after the Belfast Agreement had 
great difficulties in finding a job because of their past records, even though the labour 
market would have been capable of absorbing them (Rolston 2007, 271).  
In sum, the endurance of structural economic causes of civil war hampers DDR. DDR 
cannot – and is not meant to – improve a country’s overall economic situation. It can only 
improve individuals’ economic position. While good economic conditions would appear 
to favour the DDR process, there is no guarantee for this. Apart from poor economic 
structures, the social rejection of former combatants can also hamper their transition to a 
civilian life. 
6.1.2 Political context: regime type and state capacity 
Does the political context affect the success of DDR? Certainly in the broader civil war 
literature, the political context is thought to matter a great deal for the outbreak of civil 
war and the transformation from war to peace in its aftermath.  
For example, regime type is a widely discussed factor. Using a rather static concept of 
regime type, Hegre et al. (2001) demonstrated that very democratic and very autocratic 
states run a low risk of war, while mixed forms of government are more prone to war. A 
study published in the same year by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothschild (2001, 189), 
however, found, in line with Dixon (1994) and Mansfield and Snyder (2005), that the 
presence of a semi-democratic or democratic regime (prior to the conflict) increases the 
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chance of lasting peace, whereas the presence of highly autocratic regimes reduces the 
chance. Central to their argument is the belief that the inclusion of opponents through 
political institutions reduces their anxiety and decreases the likelihood of defections and 
violations of peace settlements. Dixon (1994) theoretically explained his findings by 
arguing that democracies have more efficient tools for resolving conflicts at an early stage 
and are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements. This possibility of 
participation could potentially also foster the success of DDR programmes if combatants 
feel that they can voice their concerns and contribute to political decisions. However, no 
studies have yet investigated this potential link.  
In a major quantitative study of abducted members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
in northern Uganda, Blattman (2009) showed that former combatants actually enjoyed 
greater political participation than individuals who had not been abducted. In fact, former 
combatants were 22 percent more likely to vote, twice as likely to be community leaders 
or have another political occupation, and 73 percent more likely to be members of a 
peace-promoting organisation (Blattman 2009).7 This could be evidence that participation 
and political ownership do matter a great deal to combatants. However, further research is 
needed to understand the underlying motivations and consequences. 
Even though no systematic cross-sectional studies have specifically addressed the issue of 
regime type and its effect on DDR programmes, DDR case studies in authoritarian 
contexts suggest that DDR can work effectively if the government is committed to DDR. 
Tajikistan is a case in point (Matveeva 2012, 30). Matveeva describes the absence of 
transparency and accountability as a virtue for the DDR process. In this particular case, it 
allowed the government to start collaborating with enemy field commanders and to close 
their eyes to their self-enrichment in return for them not spoiling the peace process 
(including DDR) and accepting the government’s consolidation of power. However, 
Kingma and Grebrewold (1998) also emphasise that the absence of a legal system or other 
forms of peaceful conflict-solving mechanisms can lead to the failure of DDR initiatives. 
The absence of a legal system entails a risk of even minor disputes resulting in the 
resumption of armed conflict because there are no mechanisms for resolving them 
peacefully. 
Apart from the type of political regime, a key political factor contributing to the success of 
DDR would appear to be the state’s capacity. In their comparative study of DDR 
programmes in the horn of Africa, Kingma and Grebrewold (1998, 12) noted that greater 
state capacity is beneficial, since it enables governments both to fulfil their commitments 
and to provide the necessary security. An effective police force is essential, for example, 
to ensure that ex-combatants and communities are protected and also so that people do not 
feel that they need to keep their arms in order to protect themselves. Also, reintegration is 
more difficult in regions with high levels of insecurity and political unrest. This security is 
missing in the DRC, for example. Demobilised combatants reported that the money they 
had received from the DDR programme (CONADER) had immediately been stolen by 
CNDP rebels. Combatants from various groups also reported an increase in punishments 
after the launch of the DDR programme – most likely to deter their members from 
                                                 
7  Due to the forced abduction of more or less all members of the LRA, self-selection was close to zero. 
The greater degree of political engagement may therefore be attributed exclusively to the combatant’s 
war experience.  
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participation. Combatants already in the DDR programme were threatened to be killed or 
arrested by the CNDP if they continued taking part in the DDR programme (Richards 
2013, 9). 
In conclusion, there is no systematic empirical evidence that particular regime types 
actually foster or hamper DDR, although theoretical considerations do suggest that 
opportunities for democratic participation and an effective legal system could help prevent 
conflict. State capacity, on the other hand, is clearly regarded as a boon to the DDR 
process since it enables the state to stick to its commitments and provide the requisite 
level of security.  
6.1.3 A wider recovery strategy 
The influence of both economic stability and political capacity show that a wider recovery 
strategy or peace-building framework in which DDR is embedded is conducive, if not 
absolutely essential, to the DDR process. There is a broad consensus that DDR should not 
stand on its own. An overall aid strategy can help not only to improve the overall 
economic environment and thus improve the chances of new civilian jobs being created, 
but also to build state capacity and create democratic institutions. In addition, it ensures 
that aid is not directed unilaterally at former combatants, as this can provoke intense 
jealousy among the rest of the population suffering from the consequences of war. In her 
study of former combatants in Liberia, Jennings (2007) found, for example, that civilians 
felt neglected and jealous of the special attention paid to former combatants. This resulted 
in a wave of civilians pretending to be combatants and trying to register for the DDR 
programme in order to receive the benefits as well. Caught in the act, one civilian justified 
his cheating by claiming that “I suffered too, so I should benefit too” (Jennings 2007, 
211).  
A comprehensive support plan, in which other forms of support are offered to the rest of 
the civilian population, is therefore needed and can help prevent feelings of hostility 
towards the combatants. A wider recovery framework is essential to ensure that DDR is 
embedded in a favourable environment and that aid reaches both combatants and the rest 
of the war-affected population. 
6.1.4 Third-party actors  
Is it good for a third party to be involved in DDR? External actors are involved in almost 
every DDR intervention, playing either a supporting or a leadership role. However, the 
influence of third-party missions in post-war situations is disputed. While scholars such as 
Walter (1997) regard third-party interventions as a decisive factor in the success of 
credible commitments, others view their role more cautiously (e.g. Hartzell / Hoddie / 
Rothschild 2001). Walter argues that the presence of a strong third party can help the 
conflicting parties to overcome compliance problems by monitoring, observing and in 
some cases even enforcing compliance. There seems to be evidence that this also applies 
to DDR programmes. As Alden (2002, 354) points out, the advantage for DDR missions is 
that, while external actors cannot replace the political will and commitment of the warring 
parties, they can indeed encourage participation and strengthen their commitment. Also, 
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by signalling that peace efforts are serious and credible, external actors can reassure 
combatants that hostilities have indeed finally ceased (Knight / Özerdem 204, 501).  
Disarmament processes that take place under external supervision seem more capable of 
resulting in sufficiently credible commitments for the conflicting parties to dare to 
relinquish their weapons without having to fear severe consequences. In a qualitative 
study of ex-combatants in Liberia, Jennings (2007, 206) found that the UN’s presence and 
supervision made a great difference. Several veterans confirmed that “they wouldn’t have 
voluntarily disarmed except to UN peacekeepers”. In Mozambique, RENAMO soldiers 
said that they would not demobilise until the blue helmets had arrived. The opposing 
FRETELIN faction, on the other hand, regarded a UN intervention as a “violation of 
national sovereignty” (Striuli 2012, 44). 
Unfortunately, empirical cross-sectional studies examining the presence of third-party 
interventions are limited to peace missions in general and do not specifically address 
DDR. Such general studies reach divergent conclusions about the virtue of third-party 
interventions (e.g. Gurr / Moore 1997; Gurr 1994; Doyle / Sambanis 2000; Hartzell / 
Hoddie / Rothchild 2001; Fortna 2004; Krain 2005; Melander 2009; Hultmann 2010; 
Bussmann / Schneider 2010). Doyle and Sambanis (2000), as well as Hartzell, Hoddie and 
Rothchild (2001), found that multilateral and UN peace-keeping operations had a 
favourable effect on peace-building. By contrast, both Dubey (2002) and Mukherjee 
(2006) concluded that third-party peace-keeping had no significant impact on the duration 
of peace. Hultmann (2010) even argued that the presence of peace-keeping missions can 
trigger violence against civilians.  
However, it should be borne in mind that cross-sectional studies need to factor in the 
selection bias of the operational locations of peace-keeping and peace-building missions. 
In other words, studies examining the correlation between the presence of third-party 
actors and the eruption of violence need to take account of the fact that most such 
missions are deployed in places “where murders lurk” (Melander 2009, 389) and 
therefore generally encounter a higher risk of violence. The effect of international 
missions – and this also applies to DDR missions – on the duration of peace can be 
adequately modelled and estimated only if the non-randomised selection of peace 
missions is taken into account. If the selection bias is taken into account, peace missions 
in general seem to have a positive effect on peace (Hofmann / Schaffer 2009, 308; 
Melander 2009; Fortna 2004).8 
With regard to third-party actors, practitioners and social scientists alike have also fiercely 
debated the importance of national ownership as a primary predisposition for success. At 
the 60th UN General Assembly, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed the 
UN’s recognition of “genuine, effective, and broad national ownership of the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process” (Knight 2008, 46). The thinking 
                                                 
8  Scholars have used a variety of methods to account for this problem. Fortna (2004), for example, 
attempted to factor in the selection bias by separately analysing the deployment of peace missions and 
the effect of these missions on the duration of peace. Hofmann and Schaffer (2009) point out, however, 
that a purely theoretical acknowledgement of the problem is insufficient. Rather, the selection bias 
needs to be factored in empirically. Failing to do so may lead to incorrect standard errors and incorrect 
significance tests (Boehmke / Morey / Shannon 2006).  
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is that a sense of ownership in the DDR process can prevent ex-combatants from turning 
into spoilers of the peace process. Rolston (2007) singles out the establishment of national 
ownership as one of the two most important factors for DDR success. While agreeing with 
Rolston on the potential of ownership, Dahl Thruelsen (2006) raises concerns about the 
potential adverse effects that could arise when local actors take over responsibilities 
without having the necessary institutional and human resource capacities. 
Related to this matter is the question of whether international leadership favours the 
probability of DDR success. Large international organisations such as the UN or the 
World Bank bring a large stock of knowledge in terms of planning and implementing 
these programmes, as well as capacities and resources that national governments might 
lack. Proponents of international leadership argue that, in post-war settings, local 
governments are often institutionally weak and prone to corruption and inefficiency. They 
point to examples like the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (CONADER) in the DRC, a commission led by the Congolese government, 
which was founded in an attempt to establish national ownership in the DDR process. 
Despite its good intentions, it has been held responsible for delays in delivering assistance 
to combatants, failures to provide the requisite resources to the country offices and a lack 
of competence in managing and coordinating the DDR process (Handson 2007). In 
Mozambique, donors preferred to finance NGOs instead of local partners because the 
latter were regarded as unreliable (Striuli 2012, 15). Problems with dishonest 
implementation partners were also reported in Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2012, 59). 
In sum, there is evidence that the presence of a third party can assist the conflicting parties 
on their way towards completing the DDR process by overcoming compliance problems. 
However, no cross-sectional studies focusing explicitly on DDR have been carried out. 
Even where a third party is on the ground, national ownership is regarded as essential 
although international leadership seems to be preferred so that sufficient capacity is 
guaranteed. 
6.1.5 State of the conflict  
Another characteristic hotly debated among practitioners is the state of the conflict. More 
precisely, the point at issue is whether a conflict must already have been terminated when 
DDR is started, or whether DDR programmes can be launched while the conflict is still 
ongoing. Opinions are somewhat divided on this point. 
Some argue that DDR programmes can start prior to the formal conclusion of war, while 
others disagree. The DDR programme initiated in Congo-Brazzaville in 2005 commenced 
while the war was still ongoing and is cited as an example of a helpful initiative that 
helped to build confidence in the peace process and thus generated an impetus for a 
comprehensive peace agreement (International Peace Academy 2002). Others insist, 
however, that peace is an indispensable precondition for successful DDR. Attempts to 
initiate the DDR process during wartime failed in Angola and Sierra Leone. One danger, 
for example, is that DDR sites are used as recruitment centres for combatants (ibid., 3). In 
a cross-sectional comparison, Banholzer (2013) found not only that DDR was 
implemented in most cases (i.e. about 65%) after (major) hostilities had ceased, but also 
that there was strong evidence of a negative correlation between implementation after 
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termination and the renewed onset of war, assuming all other variables are constant. In 
other words, starting DDR in a setting where fighting has stopped increases the chances of 
success. In this regard, DDR seems to be more suited as a peace-stabilising tool than as a 
means to end war. 
6.2 The meso level: the actual programme 
The above-mentioned research focuses on the broader economic, political and conflict 
settings in which DDR is launched. Other studies pay more attention to the technical 
aspects of DDR programmes such as timing, sequencing and programme design. 
6.2.1 Timing 
On average, one year passes between the end of hostilities and/or the signing of a peace 
agreement and the initiation of DDR (Caramés / Fisas / Luz 2006, 8). The time span 
between the end of war and the start of DDR differs immensely from one country to 
another. Some programmes, including those in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic 
and Burundi, were launched while hostilities were ongoing. Others started quite soon after 
a peace agreement or ceasefire, as in Angola, Indonesia and Sierra Leone, where all the 
programmes were launched within less than four months. However, it can also take 
several months or even years to initiate DDR, as was the case in Eritrea and Congo-
Brazzaville. 
Without doubt, postponing the start of DDR initiatives for too long only protracts the 
problem. However, scholars and practitioners seem to agree that an immediate start is not 
necessarily a precondition for success. Caramès / Fisas / Luz (2006, 9) state that “the 
rapid beginning of a DDR does not […] guarantee in the least its good progress nor the 
shortness of the disarmament and demobilisation period.” However, Cox (1996) notes 
that, if DDR programmes are postponed for too long, “both the parties and the 
peacekeepers begin to turn away from the commitment, and the resulting erosion of the 
mandate starts an irreversible process” (ibid., 132). 
6.2.2 Sequencing and incomplete programmes 
Apart from getting the timing right, many practitioners see sequencing as a major issue for 
DDR programmes. While most academic studies on DDR regard programme progress as a 
“continuum” in which one step follows the next, practitioners argue that it might be 
beneficial to start the reintegration process in parallel with disarmament and 
demobilisation, thereby engendering confidence and convincing other combatants to 
follow suit (International Peace Academy 2002, 3). Social scientists for their part tend to 
regard an incomplete DDR process as a major obstacle to success. Citing Mozambique as 
an example, Knight / Özerdem (2004) pinpointed unfinished or interrupted demobilisation 
as the main cause of the proliferation of weapons and their spread into neighbouring 
countries. Of equal concern are demobilisation processes which are not followed by a 
programme stage focusing on reintegration, as the latter is intended to address potential 
sources of frustration encountered by former combatants when returning from war 
Lilli Banholzer 
24 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
(Rolston 2007). Former combatants who are not absorbed into the legitimate workforce 
often resort to crime. A failure to address the grievances of ex-combatants in reintegration 
support activities can lead them to remobilise, as was seen in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Knight / 
Özerdem 2004). 
6.2.3 Child soldiers 
Another aspect of the more technical debate on DDR is programme design, most notably 
the handling of vulnerable groups. Children, for example, require special attention both as 
victims of hostilities and as instruments of violence. There seems to be a consensus that an 
essential precondition of successful DDR is therefore a programme design that addresses 
these distinct needs (Knight 2008; International Peace Academy 2002). In fact, while it is 
fiercely debated whether DDR initiatives prior to the end of a conflict make sense, there is 
overwhelming agreement across studies that children should be extracted out of armed 
groups regardless of whether an official settlement has been reached. In fact, citing 
Burundi as an example, Knight (2008) even argues that the demobilisation of children 
ahead of the official initiation of DDR has a positive impact as it builds confidence and 
trust. 
6.2.4 Eligible groups 
DDR programmes must be designed in such a way that they do not raise unnecessary 
barriers for combatants wishing to enrol. In the DRC, for example, the adherence to the 
“one weapon, one combatant” principle made certain combatants ineligible for the 
process. A commander from the Mai-Mai Simba reported, for example, that his troop of 
30 men owned only ten weapons (Richards 2013, 7). In a similar vein, members of the 
Mai-Mai Kifuafua reported that they carried various other weapons such as machetes, 
knives and spears, but that firearms were often shared among a number of soldiers. In fact, 
members of several armed groups stated that weapons were only distributed to combatants 
before they went into combat or to people deployed as guards, and that they were 
otherwise handed back to a general depot (ibid.). 
Since women from militant groups are not considered as great a security risk as male 
soldiers, they receive little attention in post-war situations (Knight 2008). Due to their 
infrequent participation in actual combat, women often fail to meet DDR eligibility 
criteria. The World Bank warns that DDR programmes tend to focus solely on the needs 
of young men and fail to address women’s needs. In Mozambique, for example, 
resettlement allowances were offered only to men and only men’s clothing was available 
for returning soldiers, even though many of the combatants were female (Knight 2008). 
There would therefore appear to be agreement that extra programmes addressing the needs 
of female combatants can positively influence DDR outcomes. 
6.2.5 Tailored assistance 
The final aspect of the debate on DDR programme design is how to offer the right kind of 
help to returning combatants and thus prevent soldiers from becoming frustrated. 
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Vocational training and other educational measures are a good example. These are 
generally provided to returning combatants with the aim of building a foundation for 
peaceful income-generating activities such as farming, bricklaying, carpentry, car 
mechanics and so forth. As we have already mentioned, demobilised soldiers usually 
posses certain abilities that are useful in the civilian labour market, such as discipline and 
teamwork.  
However, as Rolston (2007, 263) rightly states, “what such ex-combatants lack is not 
ability but credentials” since they have often missed out on formal education. 
Practitioners thus warn that training needs to be adapted to the demand for specific types 
of skills in the respective economies. In Mozambique, ex-combatants had great difficulties 
in finding employment in the fields in which they had been trained. In short, programme 
design should always include a thorough labour market assessment and take account of 
the job opportunities available in local markets. 
6.3 The micro level: individuals 
A much smaller, yet no less important, body of literature looks at the characteristics of 
individual combatants. As Verwimp et al. (2009, 307) point out,  
“at a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals’ behaviour and their 
interactions with their immediate surroundings, in other words, from the micro-
foundations. However, most programmes of conflict resolution, prevention and 
mediation are typically driven by regional, national and international perspectives.” 
Even though the number of researchers focusing on the micro-foundations of civil war 
through the systematic collection of individual or sub-national data is still relatively  
small, more and more serious attempts have been made to address this research gap (see 
Humphreys / Weinstein 2008; Humphreys / Weinstein 2007; Arjona / Kalyvas 2006; 
Pugel 2007 and Blattman 2010). Two questions are central to these studies:  
1. Do individuals really benefit from DDR programmes?  
2. What personal characteristics and experiences facilitate or impede their success in 
demobilisation and reintegration? 
6.3.1 Participants vs. non-participants 
The first question can be addressed only by comparing combatants who take part in DDR 
activities with those who do not. However, the lion’s share of studies focus exclusively on 
ex-combatants taking part in DDR programmes and disregard proper “control groups” in 
the form of comparable non-participants. Those looking at both groups have reached 
contradictory results. In an extensive field research project in Sierra Leone in 2003, 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007, 533) concluded that participants in reintegration 
programmes are not better reintegrated than non-participants: “Our examination of DDR 
programmes produces little evidence in support of claims that these effectively break 
down factional structures and facilitate reintegration. Combatants not exposed to the 
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DDR programme appear to reintegrate just as successfully as those that participated.” If 
this is true, then an enormous amount of financial resources is being wasted every year. 
Results from a similar study, conducted by Pugel in Liberia in 2006, point in a different 
direction. He found that “[…] empirical evidence supports the finding that those former 
combatants who registered with the national DDR programme and completed a course of 
reintegration training have reintegrated more successfully than those ex-combatants who 
chose not to participate and reintegrate on their own”. The study also revealed that ex-
combatants who formally disarmed, registered and completed a programme of 
internationally funded reintegration training were better off in terms of their socio-
economic situation than a comparable group of former fighters who did not participate in 
the national DDR programme (Pugel 2007, 6). 
Similarly, using a quasi-experimental design to compare a group of non-participants with 
participants in a reintegration programme in northern Uganda, Banholzer (2012) observed 
a marked difference in the development of social capital between the two groups. Former 
child soldiers taking part in an educational/vocational training programme scored higher 
on “hard” and “soft” indicators of social capital such as the number of friends, club 
membership and trust and a sense of belonging to a family and community. However, and 
in line with Humphreys and Weinstein (2007), she did not find any difference between the 
main and control groups in the level of acceptance and the feeling of attachment to their 
former rebel group. What these mixed results demonstrate is that more efforts need to be 
invested in the careful design of indicators capturing concepts such as “reintegration” so 
as to increase their comparability. 
6.3.2 Sociometric characteristics 
Every returning combatant has to deal with his or her own personal situation, which will 
arguably influence his or her willingness and ability to disarm and reintegrate. So what do 
we know about the influence of individual characteristics and experiences, and how these 
unique features might lead to the failure or success of DDR? 
Economic considerations not only play a role in terms of country-specific growth rates or 
stability. They are also thought to affect an individual’s choices to arm, disarm or rearm. 
Although the “greed argument”, i.e. the notion that individuals join rebel groups for 
economic reasons, has found a great echo in social scientific research (e.g. Weinstein 
2005; Oyefusi 2008), not all researchers have found empirical evidence for this hypothesis 
at a micro level. In fact, Deininger (2003) is one of the few to present proof that a scarcity 
of economic opportunities, the presence of expropriable wealth and low levels of human 
capital (which in turn lessen the prospects of getting a job in the regular economy) all 
increase the likelihood of individuals joining rebel groups. Providing further support for 
the proponents of the opportunity cost argument, Oyefusi (2008) concludes that low 
income levels encourage individuals to participate in rebel organisations. 
Other studies find surprisingly little support for the greed argument, however. In Liberia, 
only 4% of rebels cited “money” as the main incentive for joining a rebel organisation 
(Pugel 2007, 36). In their survey of Colombian combatants, Arjona and Kalyvas (2006) 
also found no evidence that individuals join a militant group for economic reasons. 
When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 27
However, while there is likely to be some similarity of motivation, the reasons for joining 
an armed group and for either staying with or leaving an armed group need not be entirely 
identical. Unfortunately, very few systematic studies have been performed of why fighters 
decide to leave an armed group, most probably because it is difficult to gather this 
information from active combatants. The study of Somalian combatants by Banholzer, 
Schneider and Odenwald (2013) forms an exception here, as it uses a data set of active 
Somalian soldiers in a wide range of militant organisations. The analysis reveals that 
wealthy fighters (i.e. those claiming to possess valuable property) are more reluctant to 
disarm. Equally, soldiers paid with khat (a narcotic drug) are less keen to enrol in DDR 
programmes. Khat is a valued form of payment because it often proves more of a stable 
“currency” than money and can easily be sold-on.In both cases, combatants seem to profit 
from instability and the war economy and are therefore less motivated to end the status 
quo.  
Being well-off rather than poor is also a hindrance with regard to reintregation. 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) report that wealthier and better educated combatants 
find it more difficult to reintegrate – a surprising outcome considering that they should 
have better chances of finding new jobs and sustaining themselves. But again, this shows 
that a closer look needs to be taken at the potential opportunity costs. 
Age is an influential determinant of individuals’ behaviour. A distinction is made in this 
regard between regular soldiers and soldiers who join an armed group as children. Several 
studies show that the lives of young individuals are particularly impacted by combat 
experiences – a finding that needs further investigation given that rebel organisations are 
increasingly recruiting children as soldiers. The invention and spread of small arms, which 
can even be operated by children under the age of ten, have been a prime factor in making 
children attractive targets for recruiters. However, views about the impact of age in the 
context of DDR vary. Some sources regard child soldiers as “damaged, uneducated 
pariahs”, as Blattman and Annan (2010) cite a New York Times editorial, or as “future 
barbarians” and “killing machines” (Verhey 2001, 1). Trying to reintegrate these 
children and adolescents is often seen as a hopeless task (ibid., 1).  
Other academic studies have found evidence that former child soldiers can re-enter 
civilian life if given adequate support (Boothby / Crawford / Halperin 2006, 87). 
Unfortunately, most studies still rely on ethnographical evidence. There are “virtually no 
representative data or well-identified estimates” (Blattman / Annan, 2010, 882), as 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Blattman and Annan (2010) point out. One of the few 
large-scale micro-level studies, the Survey of War-Affected Youth (n=1000) conducted by 
Blattman and Annan (2010), found evidence that children in the LRA, the Northern 
Ugandan rebel group, were as likely to be employed after demobilisation as their non-
fighting comrades. However, they were half as likely to be engaged in skilled jobs and 
they thus earned one third less on average – notably due to the education they had missed 
while in the bush. Despite this observation, the authors concluded that the impact of war 
on young Ugandans might be less severe than often cited and that “(the) result speaks to a 
remarkable resilience among youth, even among those youth reporting the highest levels 
of distress” (Blattman / Annan 2010, 883).  
Other studies report high levels of social isolation and the formation of sub-groups among 
children who had shared the same faith during war, leading in turn to exclusion and hostile 
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reactions from the host community (Elbert / Weierstall / Schauer 2010). Systematic 
interviews with former LRA rebels indicated that the younger a child was at the time of 
their abduction, the harder it was for them to form a trusting relationship and a sense of 
belonging to a host community after leaving their armed group. Children also find it 
harder to form new friendships (Banholzer 2012). Observing similar patterns, Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2007) noted a correlation between joining at a young age and later 
reintegration struggles. 
A possible explanation for the social troubles of child soldiers in the aftermath of war is 
provided by an analysis of individual-level data on combatants collected in the eastern 
provinces of the DRC by Weierstall et al. (2013). This study shows that younger 
individuals not only tend to commit themselves more firmly to the violent lifestyle 
required to survive in rebel groups, but are also more likely to enjoy perpetrating violence 
or – to use the psychological jargon – to develop “appetitive aggression”. It is probably the 
anti-social and aggressive behaviour of young recruits that leads them to be rejected by 
their host communities, which in turn leaves them with a feeling of alienation and social 
impoverishment. 
Gender is also assumed to influence an individual’s chances of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration. While the “standard” ex-combatant is usually thought of 
as male, militant groups contain large numbers of girls and women. Despite the examples 
of female soldiers (e.g. in the Tamil Tigers), a more common role for women is to be 
abused as sex slaves and coerced “wives”, or to act as carriers, cooks or spies (McKay / 
Mazurana 2004). Deprived of formal ranks within most militant groups, girls are often 
disregarded and insufficiently involved in the demobilisation and reintegration process. 
McKay and Mazurana (2004, 36) complained that none of the formal DDR programmes in 
northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique adequately considered the needs of 
returning women, although these were acute. In these countries, many female members of 
armed groups were sent straight home to their communities, without being offered any 
assistance. Acts of sexual violence, which many females have to endure during their time 
with militant groups, are not just traumatic experiences. The consequences include 
sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and motherhood. Even if their sexual 
relations within militant groups are involuntary, returning girls and women often face 
stigmatisation and rejection. 
6.3.3 Traumatisation and other psychological problems 
Traumatisation and other war-induced mental problems can be severe inhibiting factors 
for the successful reintegration of children and adults alike. In a representative sample 
(n=1114) of formerly abducted children in northern Uganda, Schauer and Elbert (2010) 
found that 48% of those who had been forced to stay with rebels for more than one month 
showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Other studies produced 
similar results. Vinck et al. (2007) found PTSD-related symptoms in 82% of formerly 
abducted children,9 and 67% in a follow-up study (Pham / Vinck / Stover 2009).10 
                                                 
9  The size of the sample in this study was 2,585. Adults were aged 18 years or older, and came from four 
districts in northern Uganda. The study was conducted in April and May 2005. 
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Interviewing 169 child soldiers in northern Uganda and the DRC, Bayer et al. (2007) 
found full symptoms of PTSD in 37% of them. This mental illness results in nightmares, 
flashbacks, hyper-arousal and avoidance, symptoms which place a severe strain on the 
individual’s personal and social life. Individuals who have experienced traumatic events 
are also more likely to withdraw from their communities and to lose trust in them, as 
Dickson-Gomez (2002) showed in a qualitative study of four former child soldiers in El 
Salvador. To cope with their horrific past, many traumatised combatants are known to 
abuse drugs and alcohol, and often engage in criminal activities to fund their drug 
consumption. 
Another noteworthy finding directly linking PTSD with DDR stems from a study by 
Banholzer, Schneider and Odenwald (2013). The authors found that the mental health of 
individual combatants greatly affected their willingness to disarm. Those combatants who 
were diagnosed with PTSD were less willing to hand in their weapons. People suffering 
from PTSD have an anxiety disorder and live in a constant state of fear. Their entire life is 
directed towards the past rather than the future. It is therefore understandable that these 
people are extremely reluctant to give up their weapons.  
However, it is not just the disarmament process that may be hampered by soldiers 
suffering from this mental illness. People suffering from PTSD have been observed to 
experience serious problems during their reintegration process, indeed perhaps to an even 
greater extent. Mogapi (2004) notes that ex-combatants who suffer from mental illnesses 
have concentration difficulties, are extremely aggressive, have difficulties at work and are 
thus also more likely to lose their jobs. These struggles lead former fighters to experience 
feelings of helplessness and depression.  
While child soldiers and adult combatants alike are exposed to mental illnesses, children 
appear to be more vulnerable and impacted by traumatic stress because they are still in a 
development process. Schauer and Elbert (2010) explain that exposure to specific stress 
factors during warfare causes the “brain to develop along a stress-responsive pathway“ 
(ibid., 332). This means that brain structures are formed so that they are best adapted to 
survive the cruel world in which the child soldier grows up, a world of constant danger, 
violence and deprivation. As a consequence, the brain develops capabilities for reacting 
quickly to threats in the form of intense anger, aggression or fear (ibid., 332). These 
reactions persist even when war is over, causing immense difficulties in adapting to 
peaceful environments (ibid.; but see also Elbert et al. 2006 and Teicher et al. 2002). 
Somasundaram’s book entitled “Scarred Minds” (1998) adduces evidence that traumatic 
events can inhibit children’s school careers. In a sample comprising six different schools 
in the northeast of Sri Lanka, up to 65% of children reported memory problems, between 
30% and 60% claimed to have difficulties concentrating and 35-60% reported a loss of 
motivation to remain in education. The problems of war-affected children showcase the 
severe impact warfare can have on an individual’s ability to carry on with their life when 
war is over, irrespective of the environment in which they live. Schauer and Elbert (2010, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10  The size of the sample was 2,875. Participants were selected by means of multi-stage stratified cluster 
sampling, conducted in eight districts in northern Uganda. 
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347) warn that “another round in the cycle of violence seems inevitable if psychological 
wounds are not addressed. Children know that hidden weapons and former comrades are 
always waiting somewhere out there.” However, once the problem is diagnosed, PTSD 
can be effectively addressed and the symptoms reduced by treatment. Screening for and 
treating PTSD should therefore become standardised components of DDR programmes. 
6.3.4 Personal wartime experiences  
Alongside the above factors, the length of time an individual stays or is forced to stay with 
an armed group appears to affect the DDR process. For instance, rebels who stayed for 
more than a year in the RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambican) base camp in 
Mozambique were found by Arnston and Boothby (2002, 3)11 to exhibit a greater degree 
of anti-social and aggressive behaviour than combatants who spent a shorter period in the 
camp. Other studies argue that it might not be the absolute amount of time spent in the 
field, but rather the extent to which an individual was involved in violent combat, that 
shapes their attitudes and behaviour.  
Empirical support for this argument comes from various commentators. Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2007, in Sierra Leone) concluded that individuals who had been members of 
very abusive militant groups faced greater difficulties during the reintegration process. 
Amone-P’Olak et al. (2007) noted that individuals who were forced to commit atrocities 
against their own families and communities broke their civil and social attachments. Many 
of these soldiers believed that they could never return home and thus preferred to stay with 
their militant group. As a Ugandan soldier explained, “I had to stay because, in the bush, 
killing is normal. At home I won’t be a person of any importance, I thought”.12 
Based on the observation that a number of combatants in Somalia reported no 
involvement in violent combat at all, Banholzer, Schneider and Odenwald (2013) pointed 
to the distinction between the length of time spent by individuals in armed groups and the 
intensity of their combat experience. Being a member of an armed movement does not 
automatically imply close involvement in battles. This in turn influences the combatant’s 
willingness to disarm. Soldiers who have spent 20 years or more with an armed group are 
generally more reluctant to give up their weapons, whereas soldiers who have frequently 
been involved in combat tend to be fairly willing to disarm. 
7 Conclusion and practical implications 
As we have shown, failure to reintegrate returning fighters can have a highly disruptive 
impact on a country’s peace process. Every year, sizeable human and financial resources 
are invested in DDR programmes. While the prevailing international consensus suggests 
that the chance of peace is considerably higher if countries receive this form of aid during 
the critical transition from war to peace, only a small body of literature attempts to back 
                                                 
11  The study embraced 42 former Mozambican boy soldiers, aged 6 to 16. 
12  This quote comes from an original psychological session protocol with a former child soldier (ibid.: 
JM20) in northern Uganda. 
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this assumption with evidence. This discussion paper provides an overview of factors 
identified in the literature as contributing to the success of DDR programmes. The 
analytical conceptualisation helps to distinguish between context factors, programme 
factors and individual-level factors, all of which can – as the synthesis of the literature has 
shown – have quite different effects. 
Even though we have discussed many of the factors that contribute to the success of DDR, 
some seem to stand out as being underpinned by more evidence than others. 
• While DDR can improve the personal economic situation of combatants, it cannot 
impove the economy as a whole. It therefore needs either to be implemented in 
economically prosperous settings or to be accompanied by a broader recovery 
strategy. In the worst case, combatants might otherwise simply be reintegrated into 
poverty. 
• There needs to be a certain degree of state capacity to ensure that governments are not 
only willing to carry out the DDR process, but also capable of fullfilling their 
commitments and providing security to the demobilised combatants. A functioning 
legal system and peaceful problem-solving mechanisms can help to “tame 
combatants” and prevent minor conflicts from escalating into major hostilities. 
• The presence of a third party cannot replace the commitment of the warring factions 
to DDR, but it can provide a framework that facilitates the DDR process. If 
commitment is genuine, a third party can help by monitoring both sides’ compliance 
and thus have a positive impact on the feasibility of DDR. 
• DDR hits its limits if implemented while hostilities are still ongoing. DDR should 
therefore be launched when violence has ebbed or a peace agreement has been signed. 
In this regard, DDR should be seen more as a peace-stabilising than as a peace-
creating tool. As a great deal of trust in the peace process is required for combatants to 
be prepared to hand over their primary instruments of defence and income, launching 
such initiatives before the conflict is over seems to be asking too much. 
• On a different note, programmes need to match the target group. All too often, 
members of armed groups – especially women – fall through the raster of DDR 
eligibility criteria even though they should receive help. On an equal footing, the type 
of skills training offered to combatants needs to be relevant to the local economy. 
Otherwise, participants will become deeply frustrated if they cannot find any 
employment. 
• Finally, combatants should not be treated as a homogeneous group. Some former 
fighters may handle their return very well, while others will struggle immensely. The 
identification of these “high-risk” groups should be a key component of DDR 
preparations. The literature points in this connection especially to combatants who 
were recruited at a very young age and soldiers suffering from mental issues such as 
PTSD. Equally, individuals with low chances of finding alternative employment (i.e. 
those who remained with an armed group for many years or even decades) and those 
combatants profiting from the war economy (i.e. those who receive drugs as a salary 
substitute) will be less willing to disarm. Only by clearly identifying such groups is it 
possible to address their needs properly and for DDR to unfold its entire potential. 
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However, what this literature synthesis also shows is that much more research is needed in 
order to systematically observe those conditions that favour DDR and the peace process in 
general. While DDR programmes need to be accompanied by thorough evaluation 
processes, scholars should concentrate on gathering representative samples of combatants 
and start using comparable indicators in order to scale up comparability. 
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